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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF 
UTAH, NATION AL ASSOCIA-
TION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
EZRA C. LUNDAHL, INC., E. 
CORDELL L UNDAJ:IL, SI-IYR-
LEEN B. LUNDAHL, EZRA C. 
LUNDAHL and LE AT I-I A A. 
LUNDAHL, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
11359 
Answer To Petition For Rehearing 
The plaintiff and respondent having petitioned this 
court for a rehearing from its decision filed May 20, 
1969, the defendants-appellants file their answer to peti-
tion for rehearing. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF 
THE CASE 
Plaintiff Bank seeks a rehearing on a decision of 
1 
the Supreme Court in the above-entitled matter which 
was rendered May 20, 1969. 
DISPOSITION IN PRIOR DECISION 
In its May 20, 1969, decision the Supreme Court 
reversed that part of the trial court's judgment allowing 
the plaintiff Bank to charge the $8100.00 check against 
the defendants and affirmed that part of the trial court's 
judgment awarding defendants $893.93 on their counter-
claim. Costs to defendants (appellants). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING 
Defendants-appellants seek to have the Supreme 
Court deny a rehearing on this matter and sustain the 
court's decision rendered on May 20, 1969, as the deci-
sion of this court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants-appellants refer to the original state-
ment of facts made by them in their original brief. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRET-
ED SECTION 70A-4-212 UCA 1953 AS AMEND-
ED. 
2 
POINT II 
TI-IE COURT FULLY CONSIDERED AS 
' SIIO\VN BY lTS DECISION, ALL MATTERS 
PERTAINING TO THE ACCORD AND SAT-
ISFACTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUPREivlE COURT CORRECTLY IN-
TERPRETED SECTION 70A-4-212 UCA 1953 
AS AMENDED. 
In plaintiff's petition for a rehearing it appears that 
the plaintiff still is contending that there is no distinc-
tion between a "chargeback" and a "refund". While 
th~~matter was.se~t, 'n re ..t~~· in e em~:_, 7- '*-I' t,-,,  M 1/-~- u 1 w ,.,,-,v tMi _,{,(, 
brief \On1page 18, and so was arg at th eari g, 
it still appears that the plaintiff cannot understand or 
ref uses to admit the distinctions between those two terms 
as used in Section 70A-4-212. When applied to the facts 
of this case, as found by the jury, it is absolutely clear 
that this court has correctly interpreted and applied 
that governing section of the code. 
Without repetitiously reciting all the authorities 
set out in our brief on appeal, the following summary 
is suggested: 
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(a) The right to "charge back" and the right 
to a "refund" are determined by this section 70A-4-212. 
( b) "Charge back" relates to the funds of the 
customer then on hand in the particular bank account. 
( c) "Refund" is to obtain monies in some legal 
manner from the customer when no monies are then i11 
his account in that particular bank. 
(d) Both the right to "chargeback" and to 
"refund" terminate if the bank fails to act by its "mid-
night deadline". 
( e) Under subsection ( 4) of 70A-4-212, the 
bank has a right to "chargeback" an uncollected check 
even though it is in some way negligent but it remains 
liable in damages. For example, if a bank negligently 
holds an uncollected check beyond its midnight dead- i 
l~~, -~:1!1_ !ti.ll ~h-<~ge~,~~,, tp~~ ~r1t~Z~~~s~ ~~~ rcul;~ , ~ 
tomer s acdo~£ut/ltheJilrylnd the court touriei that ttf -
,j 
the customer, Lundahls Inc., was "damaged" in the -~?111 1 
amount, which was charged back, to-wit $893.93. This ' 
provision was inserted to protect the bank against suits 
by third parties for wrongful dishonor of a customer's 
check, where a check failed to clear and be honored by 
the bank only because of the chargeback. This is done 
to protect the bank from damages potentially far in 
excess of the original item. It is obvious that the damage 
suffered by a customer whose account is erroneously 
charged back will always be at least the amount im-
properly charged back to his account, plus any other 
actual damages sustained. 
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(£) The jury expressly found that the bank 
was negligent in failing to notify Lundahls Inc. in the 
time prescribed by law or other reasonable time about 
the dishonored check. 
(g) The bank "charged back" the dishonored 
check against the Lundahl' s account and obtained 
$893.93 from that account damaging them in that 
amount. If there had been sufficient monies in the cus-
tomers' account to obtain $8,100.00, the face amount of 
the check, the bank could have "charged back" that 
amount under the code, even if negligent, but would 
have remained liable in damages for that amount. 
(h) The customer counter-sued the bank for 
the damages it suffered as a result of the "charge back," 
to-wit: the sum of $893.93. 
( i) No third parties, if any had been involved, 
could have had a cause of action against the bank if 
said third party had a check from the customer which 
did not clear the customer's account due to "charge-
back" by the bank. (See Official Comment No. 5 to 
70A-4-212, quoted by plaintiff at page 6 of its petition 
for rehearing) . 
( j ) The bank being negligent as found by the 
jury, had no right to a "refund". 
(k} Section 70A-4-212 subsection ( 4} spe-
cifically refers only to "chargeback" and has no appli-
cation to "refund" which remedies are entirely separate 
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and dis tin et. A full discussion of this distinction was 
presented to this court in appellants' brief on appeal, 
page 42-49. On page 45 we quoted the Editorial Boar<l 
to the Uniform Commercial Code, who concluded: 
"The official comments, however, show that 
the omission of the right of refund in this sub-
section ( 4) was deliberate." 
On page 46 we again quoted the Code's Edtiorial Board, 
when they wrote: 
"In our opinion there is no justification for 
giving a negligent depository bank a right of 
refund against a customer. 
( 1) A bank, to obtain a "refund" must be 
free from negligence. 
( m) The jury in this case found the bank neg-
ligent. 
( n) The conclusion is inescapable: The bank, 
by "chargeback" obtained $_893.93 and damaged its 
customer in this amount. They had no right of "refund" 
under the fact of this case because of their negligence. 
(o) This court's interpretation of 70A-4-212 
in its announced decision is accurate and is consistent 
with all of the authorities and should not be disturbed. 
POINT II 
THE COURT FULLY CONSIDERED, AS 
SHO,VN BY ITS DECISION, ALL :MATTERS 
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PERTAINING TO THE ACCORD AND SAT-
ISFACTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
In answer to petitioner's contention that there was 
no meeting of the minds between the bank and Lund-
ahls, we call to the court's attention the question to the 
jury, and its answer, concerning this very issue: 
"4. Was there a complete accord and satisfac-
tion between the parties on or about January 4, 
1967, whereby all accounts were settled and com-
promised between the parties, including a prom-
ise, if any you find, on the part of the bank to 
surrender up the written guaranty? Answer Yes 
or No. 
"Answer: We, the jury, agree on the first part 
of Question No. 4 - there was complete accord 
and satisfaction between the parties on Jan. 4, 
1967. 'Ve find that the guaranty was included 
in this said agreement." 
The evidence is in the record and plaintiff-respond-
ent cannot escape the fact that it was the intention of 
Lundahls Inc. and Hesston Corp. to _settle all debts .of 
Lundahl's Inc. with the bank, "direct and contingent" 
and to satisfy all of Lundahl' s legal obligations so that 
Hesston Corp. could begin business without any fear 
of claim of direct or contingent liabilities whatsoever. 
The bank was fully aware of this agreement for it was 
written into the escrow agrement which the bank held 
and the final settlement took place in that very bank 
with the participation of the bank's officials. It also 
knew Hesston Corp. demanded a full and final settle-
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ment of all debts. The jury found that the perso11al 
guaranty was also included in the accord and satisfac-
tion. The guaranty was by the Lundahls individually 
for the purpose of guarantying the corporate debts of 
Lundahls Inc. 
The parties met for the purpose of making a full 
and complete satisfaction of all claims, both direct and 
contingent between Lundahls Inc. and the bank. The 
amounts were agreed upon and a payment in considera-
tion thereof in the total amount of $78,402.65 was giveH 
to the bank at that time and accepted by them as pay-
ment in full. 
There was no doubt in the jury's mind that this was 
a complete accord and satisfaction and that the bank 
accepted the same as such and agreed to return all in-
struments to the Lundahls Inc. including the guaranty. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants and appellants respectfully request 
this court deny a rehearing on this matter and that this 
court's decision rendered on May 20, 1969, remain the 
decision of this court. 
Respect£ ully submitted, 
MANN & HADFIELD 
Walter G. Mann 
Reed W. Hadfield 
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